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ABSTRACT

In route to the Majors, there are two major pathways. Talented players may either
sign with a Major League Team to start their careers in the in the Minor Leagues, or play
NCAA Baseball. Using ordinary least squares (OLS), the career differences between
NCAA and Minor League players will be examined. Major League players whose careers
began after 1985 are included and are divided into quintiles by the player’s career mean.
Dividing the players into quintiles increases the accuracy of the analysis because the
career path varies according to player ability. The College Players are separated into eras
with particular emphasis placed on those who played college after 1999. This paper
confirms previous analysis that career paths differ among the OPS quintiles and finds that
significant career path differences exist between college and non-college Major League
Players. There are also small differences between the different college eras in the effect
on a player’s productivity profile. Overall, former NCAA baseball players retire and peak
a little later in age but have shorter careers.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

Ever since Bill James and the founding of SABR, baseball has been the focus of
much statistical analysis. This paper wishes to add to their work by analyzing the
differences between the career path of former NCAA baseball players, and those who
signed directly out of high school. First, a broad overview of the methodology and
justification for its reasoning. Major League players are separated into quintiles in order
to confirm prior quintile analyses and discover new relationships. The final section will
demonstrate and examine how the career paths differ between college and non-college
players within the same quintile.
Major League Baseball is not only America’s Pastime, but also the first major
sports league to develop an extensive minor league system. Teams knew that in order to
be successful good players would have to be identified, acquired and developed
appropriately. The minor leagues are correctly seen as the first and last important step
along this path to the Majors, with NCAA baseball playing a minor role in the
development of professional talent. Professional football and basketball have traditionally
relied on the college ranks to serve as the equivalent of minor league baseball and
develop professional talent. However, the NBA is experimenting with a developmental
league to better prepare the most talented players for the professional game. The
Developmental league still is not the prescribed method for reaching the NBA. College
basketball is still the dominant path. The NFL is not testing out a minor league system,
but wholly relies on NCAA Football to procure their football talent.
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All of the major sports leagues do differ with their college version in significant
ways, but baseball is interesting because it has a league that largely bypasses college. The
Minor League baseball players play with exactly the same rules as their Major League
peers, but a slightly different version exists in NCAA baseball. This makes for interesting
comparisons between those players who signed out of high school and those who chose
the college route.
Baseball is unique in that it has two major pathways to reach the highest level,
College and Minor League baseball. Those players who do not decide to begin their
Minor League careers immediately after high school generally sign with a college team.
Once a player decides to attend college, he must remain at his school until at least his
junior season, at which point he may then sign a major league contract. Unlike
professional Basketball and Football, these players do not immediately play in their
professional league at the highest level. These former NCAA athletes typically spend
some period of time in the Minor Leagues. This paper is going to examine the differences
between the two paths to the Majors and their effect on a player’s career.
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CHAPTER TWO
PRODUCTIVITY METRICS AND PROFILES

Productivity Metrics
Only offensive players are examined. Pitchers are not only primarily compensated
for their pitching, but their main contribution to a team’s winning is on the defensive side
of the game. In half of major league baseball, the pitcher does not even log official atbats. He has a designated hitter that bats in his stead. Including pitchers in the sample and
gauging their career performance based on their batting skills would lead in inaccuracies
and only muddy the findings.
Commonly used hitting metrics are batting average (BA), slugging percentage
(SLG), runs batted in (RBI) and on-base percentage (OBP). The hitting metrics that
correlate more highly with total bases are better. More total bases lead to more runs and
this in turn leads to more winning. Since winning is the point of the game, production
statistics that correlate most strongly with this logic are preferred.
Batting average is the percentage of time a hitter gets on base out of his official
at-bats. It roughly measures how often a player hits his way safely to at least first. This is
not the most accurate metric in measuring total bases and therefore, runs produced.
Batting average treats all hits equally, and does not account for hits that are for more than
one base. Slugging percentage is better because it weighs hits by the number of bases
produced. A homerun generates more bases and counts more under slugging percentage
than a single. However neither of these metrics measures a crucial way to get on base
without hitting, walks.
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Walks happen when the pitcher throws four balls, before either a playable hit, or a
strike out. Counting walks as a measurement of a hitter’s production, instead of just a
pitcher’s mistake, makes for much more accurate offensive analysis. Omitting this
statistic is leaving out a key way for batters to earn bases without generating outs.
Offensive production can be broadly stated as the ability to get on and advance bases
without generating outs. Outs are key because they are the primary barrier to scoring runs
and therefore winning games (Hakes and Sauer, 2007).
On-base percentage (OBP) simply measures how likely a player is to get on base
safely, discounting sacrifice hits. OBP evaluates how likely a player is to get on base out
of his trips to the plate. It is much better than batting average simply because it
incorporates walks in its measurement.
On-base plus slugging (OPS) is the best metric to measure a hitter’s production
because it takes the likelihood of a player to simply arrive at first safely (OBP) and adds
hits weighted by the number of bases generated (SLG). This is a simple, accurate metric
to estimate hitting production and evaluate offensive production. It is also the single, best
indexed hitting statistic that most highly correlates with run production (Lewis, 2003)
What about other offensive metrics, like RBI? RBI is not a reliable hitting metric.
It is quite noisy and a significant amount of the variance can be attributed to a hitter’s
place in the batting order of the lineup. Some hitting spots are better suited to drive in
runs than others, rendering RBI an inaccurate metric of an individual hitter’s skill and
production (James, 1988). Also, it is harder to isolate the individual’s contribution to
winning with RBI because there are multiple offensive players involved. A great hitter
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may have lower RBI’s simply because his teammates are not productive hitters and
cannot get on base. Moreover, this reasoning still holds that on-base percentage and
slugging percentage are the two metrics that most highly correlate with creating runs and
winning.
Productivity Profiles
As players age, their productivity increases until a certain maximum point, and
declines after. Logically this makes sense because players would not retire otherwise and
continue to increase production.
As time progresses, MLB players gain experience and knowledge of the game,
increasing their skill. More knowledgeable players are preferred to those with less
baseball knowledge, ceteris paribus. They are better able to predict what their opponents
will do and adjust their strategies accordingly. Playing in more games exposes players to
an increasing variety of situations, and more opportunities for learning. They also gain
intuitive knowledge that is difficult to convey and quantify, but nonetheless increases his
offensive skill and production. This “mental aging” combined with physical prowess is
what leads to increases in the production of players.
The alternative force at play is physical aging. Older players’ bodies cannot
handle the physical toll of the grueling MLB season. These players do not recover from
games as quickly, and they are more likely to have a serious injury. This leads to lower
bat speed and less hitting production toward the end of his career. They also play fewer
games because of the slower recovery time. In short, older players are not as productive
when they play and play fewer games due to physical aging.
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These two factors lead to more of a quadratic regression regarding offensive
production because mental aging dominates the earlier career stages before physical
aging takes over.
This is largely similar to what happens in the general workforce. Workers gain
knowledge through experience and increase productivity. Then physical aging takes over
and productivity levels decline. The average worker peaks between 45-55 before
declining. Aubert and Crépon (2003) demonstrated that the average worker in France
improves in productivity until about the age of 45. Then the productivity curve flattens
out until finally the worker loses productivity and declines. This holds true across sectors.
Human Capital Theory also weighs in. The earnings of major league players are
discounted by the training costs. This training is costly and should be viewed as an
investment since it is undertaken to increase the player’s future ability and therefore
income. (Becker, 1968) This happens early in the career, but the players do earn a
premium later in their careers. Viewing employees as capital investment projects yields
important insights into wage and careers.
Human Capital Theory also explains firm behavior by the teams. Teams prefer
younger players, ceteris paribus. They have a higher possibility of improving to become a
great player and also younger players contribute more to winning than they are paid,
mainly because of the collective bargaining agreement. This in part, explains why teams
are so eager to dump players in the bottom quintile because there are other, younger
players who have a higher chance of being good.
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This paper is in the vein of Krohn (1983), Albert (1999) and Fair (2008). A
player’s career profile will be examined using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression
and a quadratic analysis. However, it will differ by separating the hitters into quintiles to
produce a more accurate model. Hakes and Turner (2009) showed there are biases that
occur when all of the players are lumped together and examined as one group.
Players that differ in ability do not have the same productivity curve. They have
different intercepts, slopes and peaks. Marginal players enter MLB around the same time
as other players, but only improve slightly before retiring well before better players. They
peak slightly above replacement level before flaming out soon after. Top quintile players
both peak and retire later than their counterparts. Their findings are substantial enough to
warrant the separation of the players in order to more accurately describe productivity
profiles in Major League Baseball.
Hitters are separated into quintiles according to their OPS indexed by each
position’s mean. This prevents some positions (i.e. catchers) from being overly
represented in the bottom quintiles and other positions (outfielders for example) in the
top quintiles. Some positions are more valued for their defensive skills because some
positions are more difficult to play in the field. Generally this applies to catchers, second
basemen and shortstops. First and third basemen and outfielders are expected to have
more offensive production in part, because they are easier to play defensively. Since
teams make these distinctions and differ offensive expectations according to the position,
it makes sense to separate the players into quintiles according to their position means.
This also matches the methodology of Hakes and Turner.
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CHAPTER THREE
DATA OVERVIEW AND BASIC OPS REGRESSION
Data and Variables
As in Hakes and Turner, only seasons with at least 130 official at-bats are
analyzed 1. Some players have abbreviated, highly productive seasons that are out of line
with his normal offensive production and not indicative of his ability. Leaving these
seasons in the sample would only muddy the findings. The converse is also prevented via
this minimum threshold. Hitters with less than three Major League seasons are dropped
from the sample. This drops the most marginal players who don’t have substantial careers
in the sample from being examined for the effects of OPS change and college experience.
All years since 1985 are in the sample. Players who were active and their seasons prior to
1985 are also included in order to better gauge the progression of their careers. Not
including these prior seasons would skew the data not accurately weighing the mean of
their offensive production and not track the change in OPS over the course of a career.
There are over 7600 player-seasons examined that correspond with over 950 player
careers.
The summary statistics for the quintiles tell a story (Table 1). The top quintile has
an OPS that is nearly 300 points above that of the average player in the bottom quintile.
These elite players are also 150 points above the mean OPS in the sample. The average
observed OPS in the sample is 10% higher than the mean for that player’s career. This

1

All data comes from Sean Lahman’s Baseball Database and are available at
http://www.seanlahman.com
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matches the narrative set forth by Hakes and Turner that the top players peak later and
retire well before reaching replacement level. The top players retire before their OPS dips
to their original OPS percentage. Either teams are not willing to pay for these hitters to
continue playing, or the players retire because they do enjoy playing the game at the new,
lower point on the productivity curve. Either way, these players have more productive
years but do not use them. The only quintile that performs well below its career mean are
those in the bottom quintile. The second through fourth quintiles range from 104% the
player’s mean to 96.4%. They have an average OPS observation that is only 89% of their
career mean. This is also matches the findings in Hakes and Turner that the marginal
players debut at a certain OPS and do not much improve. Their OPS generally goes down
from where they debut. The bottom quintile takes about half as many official at-bats as
the top players. This is expected because teams want to minimize the plate appearances
for marginal players.
OPS indexed by season also demonstrates that the top and bottom quintiles differ
the most from the ones immediately next. The top quintile of players hit nearly 20% over
the mean OPS for that season and 15% more than those players in the second quintile.
The fourth quintile’s OPS is 10% higher than the bottom quintile, the second largest
difference. The top players are extraordinarily good compared to the middle quintiles and
the bottom players extraordinarily bad.
The effects of differing bat eras in college baseball will also be tested to see if
training with different equipment impacts the productivity of college players in their
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MLB careers. The three NCAA eras test are the aluminum bat era (before 1986), weightlimit era (1986-1999), and the BESR era (1999-2011).
RYdummy is the dependent variable that corresponds with the last season played
by the specific player. If that particular season is the last, then that observation will have
one for retirement year. All other seasons are coded zero. Each player that stopped play
before 2012 should have a season where RYdummy is one.
Playerops uses the ops for a specific season and is indexed by the mean
performance of the player over the course of his career for the. A mean OPS is found for
each player in the sample so that within career variation is accounted for. Comparisons
with career means are preferable since players differ in abilities, so examining the career
drop off against the mean of the entire sample will not yield as much information as the
drop off against that player’s career.
CollegeExp is a dummy variable that measures college-playing experience. This
variable is coded 1 for players with college experience and 0 if a player signed with a
major league team out of high school. Approximately 40% of the observations have
college experience. There are differences between the quintiles regarding the number of
college players.
Minoryears is a rough estimate of the number of years spent in the minor leagues.
All players drafted out of high school are assumed to be drafted 18 years after their
birthdate, and college players are drafted in their final season of amateur baseball.
Minoryears is the difference between the earliest season with at least 130 at bats and the
year drafted.
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BESR is a dummy variable that is coded 1 if the MLB player played in college
between 1999 and 2011. Bat exit speed ratio (BESR) is a performance standard for
college baseball bats that made hitting far more difficult. These newer bats limited the
amount of “pop” and also raised the minimum weight for the bats. This resulted in
college bats more closely resembling MLB wooden bats than the previous aluminum
bats. College offensive statistics dropped substantially after these new bats introduction.
This college era most closely resembles major league hitting of any tested in this sample.
The percentage of players that played during this era is 6.8%.
The interaction variables with age-squared and both BESR and CollegeExp are
included to see the effects that those dummy variables have on OPS when physical aging
takes over. If these coefficients are positive, then the playing in college lessens the aging
effect and results in longer careers.
Activeplayers is an indicator variable that identifies the players who may be
active currently. This is included for identification purposes only.
General Age and Age2
Regressing player ops indexed by the mean of his career shows that the peak
performance is between the ages of 29 and 30 (Table 2). This is a later peak than previous
studies on the subject. It does largely follow what previous analysis has found. The rsquared and therefore the explanatory power of this regression is quite low at 3.1%. This
is not surprising since age is only a small part behind the growth or decline of OPS.
Overall hitting ability and the expected OPS for a given position also explain a player’s
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OPS for that season. However, both age and age-squared are statistically significant at the
.1% level (Table 3).
One should note that this could be because players with fewer than three seasons
with at least 130 at-bats are dropped from the sample. Including players with only one or
two observable seasons would drag the peak age of players down. AAAA players are not
likely to play later on in their careers.

Player OPS Graphs
Since Hakes and Turner did not index players according to their mean, this will
add to their analysis. The graph shows that players reach their career mean at about 26
with the best players peaking higher and later than their peers (Figure 1). The peak is still
only around 3% more than their much higher average, with marginal players hardly
producing above theirs. Interestingly, Moneyball has a narrative that roughly speaks to
this (Page 193). Billy Beane is trying to dump a player, but will not go through with the
deal because the player is 26. Although these are pitchers, this does show that General
Managers do have a good idea about what a player’s output by his age and according
production.
This graph more clearly shows the differences between the quintiles career paths
(Figure 2). The bottom quintile does not have the parabolic shape of the other quintiles.
These players start with lower OPS averages and do not much improve, but simply
continue playing at a low level. The top two quintiles improve greatly over their careers.
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Even the third and fourth quintiles exhibit the typical parabolic shape that most other
career path studies have found.
The quintiles also on average, differ in the number of seasons played in the
Minors. The top players spend closer to five seasons in the minor leagues and the bottom
quintile closer to six (Table 4). The largest separation is between the first and second
quintiles, of about half of a season. The other half season difference occurs between the
second and fifth quintiles. This suggests that teams are eager to promote the best players
to the Majors, but not as eager to promote marginal and even quite good players.
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CHAPTER FOUR
COLLEGE ERAS AND REGRESSIONS
College Bat Regulations
College Baseball is divided into three eras. Unlike MLB, the bats in College
Baseball have changed substantially over time. The major aluminum bat production
companies will innovate and improve the “pop” of the bats until the NCAA intervenes.
Coaches and NCAA administrators complain that the game of college baseball is too
offensive and lower offensive production by regulating the aluminum bats. Eventually the
bat companies innovate so much within the regulations that new ones must pass to have
the desired offensive output.
Aluminum bats were first introduced into the college game in 1974. The bat
companies continued to innovate until the NCAA passed the first round of major
regulation in 1986. Bats now had a lower weight limit. Lighter bats with the same amount
of “pop” are preferred because this increases the speed at which the player can swing.
This “weight-limit” era limited offensive production for the first few years after it was
enacted. However, the bat companies still continued to innovate and improve the bats
hitting.
Much of these innovations focused on enhancing the “trampoline effect” and
enlarging the “sweet spot.” (Wilson, 2008) The trampoline effect occurs because
aluminum bats are hollow, so the metal compresses at contact and pops outward with the
ball. Wooden bats do not react to contact like this because they are not hollow and do not
have the trampoline effect (USGS, 2004). Aluminum bats make hitting easier by
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increasing the speed and distance that the ball travels, leading to more runs scored. The
sweet spot was also enlarged during the period, making solid contact with the ball easier.
In wooden bats, there is a small area where the batter can hit the ball well and have a high
chance of getting on base. This area is larger on aluminum bats and allows for poorer
contact to create base hits. These two effects greatly increased offensive production in the
college game throughout the 1990’s, exemplified by the 21-14 score in the 1998 NCAA
championship.
The next round of NCAA regulation created the Ball-Exit-Speed-Ratio (BESR)
standard. Following the 1998 season (where many scoring records were broken), the
NCAA created a higher minimum weight that varied according to the length of the bat. It
also regulated the size of the barrel (larger barrels are preferred because it allows for a
greater margin of error for the hitter), and limited the speed at which the ball could come
off the bat. All of these regulations had the intended effect and greatly lowered offensive
production (Russell, 2014).
The Runs scored per game drop with every new round of bat regulation (Figure 3)
and the drop off is over about four seasons before runs per game bottom out. When there
is a dramatic rise in offensive production over the course of around three seasons, the
NCAA steps in and limits offensive production. When Runs per game approaches seven,
this is when the NCAA has more strictly regulated the bats.
Bat regulation is also evident in statistics on home runs per game (Figure 4). Each
round of regulation happens around a peak in home run production, and the regulations
drop home runs substantially. The regulations lower home run production faster than with
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runs per game. The BESR regulations changed the home runs per game dramatically and
over the course of two seasons. This supports the narrative that bat companies continue to
innovate to help players increase their offensive production.
Unsurprisingly, NCAA batting averages also decrease with new bat regulations
(Figure 5). The declines mirror the previous figures and take place over a few seasons
before reaching a new equilibrium. The declines in batting averages demonstrate that bat
regulations are effective at increasing the difficulty of hitting and lowering offensive
production.
Outside of the obvious difference in the bats, college players play fewer games
compared with their minor league counterparts. Minor leaguers play anywhere from 135144 games a season (Baseball-reference.com), while college the college season maxes
out at around 70 games. This will test the hypothesis that players only have a limited
number of games that their bodies can handle. Fewer games played from 18-22 may
translate to less stress and perhaps more games at the end of one’s career.
General College Regression
The college variables are not statistically significant for the overall sample (Table
5). All are slightly negative. The r-squared for the entire sample is 3.4%. This contrasts
with the r-squareds for the entire sample, which are all higher. The quintile with the
highest r-squared is the second, and is nearly double that of the overall sample. The
higher r-squared does not correspond with having the most significant variables, This is
reserved for the bottom quintile.
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The bottom quintile is where all of the college interaction variables are
statistically significant. Former college players in this quintile have lower OPS and age
over much faster than their counterparts. The average college player in the sample ages
about 10% faster than his non-college peers, but for the bottom quintile, the aging more
than doubles. Interestingly, the age-college interaction variable shows that these marginal
players improve their OPS due to age much faster than other quintiles.
Age and College Interaction Variables
The impact of college experience on OPS is generally negative, but offset
positively with age (Table 6). The effects are largest on the third and fifth quintiles. There
are also positive interactions between age and players with college experience during the
BESR period.
The college age interaction variable is positive and statistically significant. All
quintiles are positive except the top quintile, which is negative, but not statistically
significant. The age-squared variable is negative across all quintiles except for the top.
The quintiles vary in significance with some not significant at all.
Interestingly the BESR interaction variables mirror the college experience
variables but with larger coefficients. Overall none of these interaction variables are
significant, but the second quintile seems to hold these variables significant. Overall there
does not seem to be a large difference between the way that BESR players and overall
college players have in their careers.
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Basic Retirement Year Regression
The basic retirement-year regression that does not differentiate between the
college eras has no statistically significant college interaction variables (Table 7). The
only significant variables for the overall sample are indexplayerops, age, age-squared and
playeractive. Playeractive is included in order to account for bias because these players
are still active and have not retired. The lack of retirement could skew the data, so the
identifier is included.
Again, the bottom quintile is most different because age and age-squared are not
statistically significant. Age and age-squared may not factor since these players generally
debut at a low OPS and burn out quickly. Marginal players do not have the nice,
quadratic productivity profile where age is a significant factor. The OPS coefficient for
the worst players is much larger than the other quintiles, telling that OPS is what most
effects retirement for marginal players. Age does not matter as much since a slight
decline in OPS forces these players out of Major League Baseball.

Retirement Year Regression
A strong inverse relationship is estimated between a player’s OPS and the
likelihood of retirement (Table 8). A decrease in OPS relative to his career mean
corresponds with an increased chance of retirement. This is the most statistically
significant of the variables and the largest coefficient. A one-percent decline in OPS
when compared to his career average increases the likelihood of retirement by roughly
53%.
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The college playing variable is strongly negative and statistically significant.
College experience decreases the likelihood of retirement by about 9.8%.
The impact of the BESR variable is evident only in the fifth quintile of players.
The impact on retirement is negative with a positive, offsetting age-interaction variable.
Playing college baseball after 1999 has a positive effect on retirement age. Combining
the BESR variable with the college experience reveals that playing baseball post-1999
increases retirement chances by about 10%. This is a vastly dissimilar outcome than the
overall college variable.
However, the make up of the BESR players are different than those found in the
college variable. The BESR players who have retired come primarily from the bottom
quintile of players and are much worse than average college players. Two-thirds of these
players come from the bottom quintile, while the majority of college players are in the
third quintile. Whether or not this is indicative of a larger trend that college players are
now worse on average, or an anomaly is not as clear.
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CHAPTER FIVE
DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
Do college players debut later than their minor league counterparts? (Table 9)
Yes, college players reach their first year above rookie status about a year later than those
drafted right out of high school. This one-year gap persists throughout the quintiles.
Interestingly, there is no discernable difference between the quintiles and all begin their
major league career around the same age (24 for minor league players and 25 for college
players). This does show that college is an approximate substitute for the Minor Leagues;
otherwise the college and minor league players would spend the same number of years
playing minor league baseball. This is not the case. Some amount of time is required to
adjust to the slightly different major league game and this is the cause of the one-year
gap.
Naturally, this gap is also observed by the different amounts of time spent
playing baseball in the Minors. College players spend only two years less time in the
Minor Leagues than their counterparts, further proving that NCAA baseball is an
imperfect substitute for the Minor Leagues baseball.
The gulf continues regarding number of years spent in the Minor Leagues (Table
4). There is a consistent gap of about two seasons in the Minors between college and noncollege players across the quintiles, even though the lowest quintile spends an extra
season in the minors compared to the top. College players spend less time in the minors
on average and about two seasons less than those in their ability quintile.
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The average length of a career is between nine and ten seasons (Table 10). There
is not much difference between the length of a college player’s career and non-college
players, but college players do have shorter careers. As expected, there is variation
between the quintiles with better hitters playing longer. The top quintile’s average career
is around three seasons longer than those of the bottom quintile. The largest gap in the
number of seasons played between college and non-college is in the top quintile. It is a
difference of nearly a season.
Are college players proportionally represented throughout the quintiles? No.
There are slight differences between the quintiles (Table 1). The top quintile has the
lowest percentage of college players at 36%. This suggests that Major League teams are
quite good at identifying talent and induce the best players to sign out of high school with
lucrative offers. The second, fourth and fifth quintiles have percentages approximate to
43% of the overall sample. The third quintile contains the second lowest percentage of
college players. There is not much of a difference between the second through fifth
quintiles, but again the top quintile proves to be unique.
College players peak at different ages than their counterparts, and this holds
across the quintiles (Table 2). There is a persistent gap between college and non-college
players, with college players peaking later. Within the top quintile, there is a gap of
nearly two years between the peak productivity age in college and non-college players.
This gap changes between the quintiles, but the college players always have their
maximum season later than their counterparts. The delay differs between the quintiles
and there is no discernable trend. The middle quintile has the largest split at 2.1 years.
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However, there is not as large of a gap between the overall average of the quintiles and
that found in other papers. This is probably because the hitters in this sample are being
measured against the mean offensive production of each individual career.
The gap in career peaks cannot be entirely explained by the fact that college
players debut later in age than their counterparts (Table 11). In the top, third and fifth
quintile, the divide is larger between peaks than between debut ages. The second quintile
has a small difference, but the fourth quintile has almost a year difference that is opposite
all the other quintiles. This is the only quintile where the difference between college and
non-college debut ages is greater than the peak performance gap. College players usually
peak somewhat later than their peers, even accounting for the difference in debut age, but
the fourth quintile tells the opposite story. However, the difference between the peak ages
is largely explained by the difference in when a career begins between college and noncollege players. Using the player-seasons, instead of the regression tells a slightly
different story (Table 12). The largest differences occur between the lower quintiles with
college players peaking later. There is no real variation between college and non-college
players in the top two quintiles, and may even be slightly negative.
There is also a difference between in the retirement ages between college and
non-college players (Table 13). Most of the variation is between quintiles with the top
players retiring nearly two years after those in the bottom quintile. Outside of the top
quintile, there is a gap of about one year that persists between former NCAA players and
their counterparts. The average retirement age for a college player is about one year later
than those who signed directly out of high school.
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Conclusion
The paths to Major League Baseball differ substantially between Minor League
and college players. These differences lead to observable outcomes among players in
Major League Baseball.
The different eras in college baseball are evident, regulations have a clear impact
on scoring, and bat companies continue to innovate to make hitting easier at the college
level. This translates into small differences in the trajectory of major league careers.
This research suggests that if a prospective professional baseball player values
education, playing NCAA baseball is a reasonable alternative to signing directly out of
high school. Your Major League career is marginally shorter, but your likelihood of
retirement is less than your counterparts. This paper demonstrates that playing college
baseball is not costly, meaning a player is not significantly disadvantaged by playing
college baseball. He enters the majors about a year later and plays about one fewer season
on average. He does peak later in his career. However, neither is a college substantially
advantaged compared to his peers by playing college baseball. NCAA baseball does not
develop high school players into superstars; it is just a reasonable alternative to the Minor
Leagues.
However, having one year less of MLB experience can be costly for the best
players. The additional season added to a top player’s career amounts to millions of
dollars in earnings. This likely explains why college experience is lowest in the top
quintile of players.
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Further Research
Now that NCAA has mandated new bat regulations that have made hitting even harder,
perhaps this will lead to further change in how college players adjust to the major
leagues. In 2011, the new BBCOR standards lowered homeruns and runs per game more
in one season than any of the other major bat regulations. Offensive production continues
to fall to levels not seen since the introduction of aluminum bats. Logically one can argue
that these players will have an easier time adjusting to the Majors, since the bats are more
similar. More seasons and careers will have to transpire before reasonable deductions
can be formulated.
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APPENDIX A
Figures

Figure A-1: Productivity Profile Indexed by Player Mean
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Figure A-2: Productivity Profile Indexed by Season Average
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Figure A-3: NCAA Runs Scored per Game
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Figure A-4: NCAA Home Runs per Game
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Figure A-5: NCAA Batting Average by Season
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APPENDIX B
Tables

Table B-1: Table of Summary Statistics.

Peak Using Position Quintiles
College No College Difference
Top 20
Second 20
Third 20
Fourth 20
Bottom 20

31.47
30.277
30.2
29.029
29.76

29.45
28.99
28.055
28.6
28.03

2.02
1.287
2.145
0.429
1.73

Table B-2: Quintile Peaks Using Positions
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Overall Peak
30.04
29.47
28.86
28.71
28.99

Table B-3: Simple Age-OPS Regression

Table B-4: Years Spent in the Minor Leagues
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Table B-5: Basic College-OPS Regression

Table B-6: College Era-OPS Regression
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Table B-7: Basic College Retirement Year Regression
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Table B-8: College Era Retirement Regression

Table B-9: Age when 130 At-bats are Reached
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Table B-10: MLB Career Length

Table B-11: Difference in Quintile Peaks Minus the Difference in Debut Age between
College and Non-college Players

Table B-12: Peak Estimation Using Seasons

Table B-13: Retirement Age of Players
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